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Abstract. The inference control technique called Auditing is discussed in this paper. Auditing is 
in many ways better than the previously known techniques. Auditing hould log all answered 
que i ies, >nd use this information to decide whether answering a new query could lead to 
comprorr I’ 2. Unfortunately, except for small dataha\es, auditing may not be readily usable in 
practice because of its excessive time and space complexity in processing a new query. !n this 
paper be restrict our study to SCI~I queries, if there are n records in the database, the problem 
of determining whether or not answering a new Sub1 query could lead to -ampromise may take 
O(n’) time and space. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to assume that the user can obtain statistical 
information of any subset of the records in the database: WC assume that stAtical information 
is only available t‘or those subsets of records in which one of their attribute values lies within ii 
certain rouge (range query). With the proper data structure, the time and space complexity for 
checking if a new range query could be answered can be reduced to O(n) time and space. or 
O( t log n) time with O( )I’ 1 space for t new range queries with I 2 II. 
1. Introduction 
The basic inference problem [7] is defined as follows: We have a iinite set 
X = {x,, . . . , s,,} and we wish to infer properties 0“ elements of X on the basis of 
sets of ‘queries’ regarding subsets of X. By restricting these queries to statistical 
queries, we have the statistical database (SDB) security problem The securit:/ 
problem for the SDB is to limit the use of the SDB SC that only statistical information 
is available and no sequent,: of queries is sufficient to infer protected information 
about any individual. When such information is obtained, ihe SDB is said to be 
compromised. 
Auditing is discussed in [6]. Logs are maintainer! to record all answered queries 
and are used to decide whether answering a new q:Jery could lead to compromise. 
* This research was supported in part by Natural Sciences and Engineering Re,search Council of 
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In some aspects, it is a better protection mechanism than the existing ones [2,3,5,8- 
I I] because it has the following features: (1) absolute security, (2) maximum 
information to the user, and (3) flexibility. 
In this paper we concentrate on SUM queries. The definition and model for 
auditing are reviewed in Sections 2 and 3. The properties of range queries are 
discussed in Section 4. An efficient data structure for auditing range queries is 
described in Section 5. Section 6 gives a conclusion. 
2. Definitions 
in general, a database is a finite set of II records in which each record has a 
number of fields. For the purpose of our studies we will assume that all records 
have two common fields, A and K, where A is the protected field and K is the key. 
Furthermore, we assume that elements of A are real numbers and K is an ordered 
set. 
Without loss of generality, let K be a finite set of first II natural numbers, { 1, . . . , n}. 
An element _Y c A which corresponds to i E K will be denoted xi. Thus, in this study, 
the database X is an n-tuple, (x-,, . . . , x,), where i E K. s, E IF!! and R is the set of all 
real numbers. For any function Q : R” + R and any S = (a,, . . . , a,,) E IR”, que):\? (Q, S) 
is a function from R” to R defined as follows: if X E IV, (Q, S)(X) = Q(S . X), where 
S X is the inner product of S and X. Q(S . X) is the response to a query (Q, S). 
A statisficul query (or simply query) is a query (Q, S) where Q is a statistical function, 
such as SUM, MAX, MWIAN, etc. In the following, we will write (Q, S)* to denote 
tin answered query, thus, by (Q, S)* we will mean query (Q, S) together with the 
response (Q, S)(X).’ In order to illustrate the above definitions, let us consider the 
following example. 
Example 2. I 
k’ ==hNI:S AI):ZMS Shl l‘l‘tt TAY1.c )K 
‘A -= 64.3 43.5 33.5 693 70.2 49.7 
Query (Q, S), where Q is ;I SV~I and S -= (0.0.89, I, 0, 0, 0) is H weighed sum and 
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A query is answerable if its response does not lead to a compromise of SDB. The 
response of an unanswerable query is undefined. The Knowledge Space (KS) includes 
the set of answered queries, AQ, and all the information derivable from AQ.2 More 
precisely, KS is a set of al! (0, S)* such that the value o(S X) can be derived from 
AQ. Obviously, a new query (0, S) is answerable if (01 S)* is in KS. We say the 
SDB X (or x) is compromised if there exist some xi whose value can be determined 
uniquely from AQ, i.e., there exists a (0, S)* E KS where S is a unit vector, i.e., 
S=(O ,..., I,... ,O). Conversely, the SDB is secure if none of the Xi in X can ble 
compromised, in other words, all the Xi have more than one solution satisfying ah 
the answered queries in AQ. 
Auditing is an inference control tecl:nique which logs all information of AQ and 
uses this information to decide whether a new query could lead to a compromise. 
Even though AQ can be arbitrarily large, there are usually redundancies in AQ and 
it is always sufficient to keep a finite set of non-redundant inftirmation to represent 
KS. The efficiency of auditing depends on how KS is represented so as to make the 
checking easy. 
3, Auditiny for S’UM queries 
is 
When Q is a SUM function 
;t linear equation 
, an answereci query (SUM, S)*, where S = (a,, . . . , a,,), 
(SUM, S)* = !%JM(S- X) = 1 q-y, = S. 
I -- I 
Since we are only interested in the security of the SDB and not in knowing the 
actual values of -xi’s, we only need to keep track of the information pertinent to the 
security. For SUM qvleries it is sufficient to keep record of the set S for each query 
in AQ and we can ignore its respons:. It is justified by the following theorem. 
Ttueorem 3.1. The security of SDB jbr S~JM queries can be determirted by he set oj‘ 
t7ector.v V,,, = {S:(Q, S)* E AQ}. 
Proof. It is easy to see that the knowledge space KS has the following properties: 
(1) If(Q.S)*cAQ, then (O,S)*EKS. 
(2) If (Q, S)* E KS, r&Q then (Q, rS)*c KS, where rS=(ra,,. . ., ra,J. 
(3) If (0, vi;, (19, w *E KS, then (Q, S+S’)*: KS, where S+S’=(a, +a{, 
. . . , a,, +a:,. 
’ Usunlly, KS contains more information than what is described here because the rejected queries 
can gij:e extra information to KS. However. we have shown in [4] that the rejected SUM queries will not 
contribute any extra information to KS. 
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From the above three properties, it follows that the set of vectors VKs = 
{S: (0, S)* E KS} is the vector space spanned by the set V,.,o, thus VKs is uniquely 
determined by VAu. This proves the theorem since security is defined solely on the 
basis of VKs. El 
For this reason we will adopt the following notational simplification: The knowl- 
edge space KS will be identified with VRs and AQ with VA,. Thus KS is the vector 
space spanned by the set of vectors, corresponding to the query sets in AQ. We say 
new query (SUM, S)* is redtrndanf if S is a linear combination of (or linearly 
dependent on) the set of vectors in AQ, i.e., SE KS. KS can be represented by a 
maximal set of linearly independent vectors called the basis, e.g., B = 
{S,:j= I,..., k} if KS is of dimension k. By elementary row operations, the matrix 
corresponding to R can be ‘diagonalized’ to a matrix of the form [I 1 B’] where I is 
an k x k identity matrix. 
Example 3.2. Consider it d;rtabase of sis records. Let 
then one of the above queries is redundant and KS can be represented by the 
following matrix: 
Let f? be in this normal form: then we have the follon*ing result. 
The SDB .Y is c,(~,~ll’ro~rrisvil iI‘ there exists a unit vector SE KS, such that (1, = I 
t‘or ;1 single i and (I, - 0 otherwise. In this ase. the YAP of s, ciln be uniquely 
determined. Ob~iousI~, if li = H, I3 is ;m identity matris, there is a unique solution 
Ibr .Y tind A’ is compromised. Hawser, ewn when k K !I, ,K still may not be secure 
if the xtlue rlf some s, can be defermined uniquely. Thus w have the following 
wcuritv rsuh.: _ 
(3 S is wxrt’ iti there doe5 not exist ;i wctor S, t B such that till N,, - 0 
for j f i and a,, = 1, uhere R is in its normal form. 
Hltsed on these rssults it is ;\ simple task to check whether a new query (SCM, S)* 
is redundant dnd 1% hether A’ is sxure. Define S’-= S -\‘f‘ , a,&. If S’= (0, . . , O), 
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then SE KS, i.e., (SUM, S)* is redundant, otherwise add S’ to B to form a new basis 
of dimension k + 1. Normalizing the new B and checking whether X is secure takes 
no more than O(kn) time, thus checking whether a new SUM query is answerable 
or not takes O(kn) time with O(kn) space for B. 
4. Range query 
In general, statistical information is not available for an arbitrary s;lbset of records 
and may only be available for those records which have some common characteris- 
tics, e.g., r;;z!e employees, or ag? group between 18 and 65, etc. We call S a range 
vector if S can be specified by t\*ro integers, (Y and p such that I d a d j3 s n + 1 
and ai=l for cydi<p and ai= 0 otherwise. For example, let n = 6, (2,6) = 
(0, I, 1, I, l,O)and (4,7)=(0,0,0, I, I, 1). 
Theorem 4.1. For any set @‘range vectors of size k, V = { (cu,pl> : i = 1, . . . , k}, (f a, # aI 
Jar all i # jT then the vectors in V are linearly independent. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Cl 
A range query is a query (Q, S) where S is a range vector. In this section it is 
assumed that k?Q consists solely of answered range queries. KS is the vector space 
spanned ‘T’y the set of range vectors corresponding to the range queries in AQ. We 
define a set of range vectors, B = {((Y&) : i = 1, . . . , k} to be a range basis if, for all 
i f _i 
a, f a, and p, f /3,. I*) 
It follows ti-ivially from Theorem 4.1 that the vectors in a range basis are linearly 
independent. The following theorem confirms that KS can always be represented 
by a range basis. 
Theorem 4.2. Let AQ be a set of answered range queries {( CY, PI), . . . , (a,,$,,,)}. KS 
can always ,5e represented by a range basis qf k linearly independent range vectors 
where k s nt 
Proof. Let AQ’ be a set of first hi linearly independent vectors in AQ, where k is 
the dimension of KS. Clearly, AQ’ is a basis for KS, consisting of range vectors. It 
remains to transform AQ’ into a range basis. Let W be the family of ail finite sets 
of linearly independent vectors. Define transformation TR: W -+ W as follows: 
if A E W forms a range basis, then TR(A) = A, otherwise the first two 
vectors in A which do not satisfy (*) in the definition of the range 
basis (i.e., vectors with common ‘end’ points) are considered; the 
‘longer’ vector of this pair is replaced by the difference of these two 
vectors. 
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For example, if vi = (Cyipi), V, = (clip,), pi = pj. tti < aj are such first two vectors, then 
TR(A) = (A - {Vi)) U {u, - pi}, where V, - , q = (aiaj). Tran:,formation TR is from W to 
W indeed, because: 
(I) it preserves linear independence, 
(2) all vectors in TR(A) are range vectors, and moreover 
(3) vector spaces KS generated by A and TR(A) are the same. 
TR can be applied only finite number of times before AQ becomes a range basis, 
because each nontrivial application of TR ‘shortens’ a vector. 0 
Example 4.3. Let II = 6, *4Q = ((I, 3), ( 1,5), ( I, 7), 0,6), (3,7)> : then TR’VQ) = 
{(I, 3), (3,5), (5,7), (2,6)} 1s the range basis for KS generated by AQ. 
It is obvious that every range query can be expressed as a linear combination of 
the range vectors in the ran gc baGs, i.e., (c$) = I:_ 1 r,(a$,>. However, the following 
theorem shows that r, is either 0 or 1 for all 1 s i c k. 
Theorem 4.4. (ap) CT KS [# there exists a subset I of { 1, . . . , k} such that (a/3) = 
1’ ~,, , ( LY,~,), where R = ((0 , p,), . . . , (q,/3~.)} is the range basis .fiw KS. 
Proof. Assume that (cY~) G KS. Since {(cI$~,) : i = 1, . . . , k} is a range basis for KS, 
there is a set k{l,..., k) and i;onzerr, real numbers r, for i E I such that ($3) = 
J’ &I. I r,(a$,>. We will prove: by induction with respect to the number of elements in 
I that r, = I for all i E I: 
t I) If /11= 1, then (t+)= Y&Y,&), so cy - (x1, p = & and therefore r, = I. 
(2) Assume that it holds for 111~ k, and let (t$) ==L,,  r,(a,&>, where Ill- k + 1. 
iA p c 1’ and ck,, = min,, , {a,;, it can be shown that (Y = CY,, and rp = 1. Therefore, 
NC hrlfve 
Since (crp) - (q3,J is a range vector (because (Y = N, and /3 -- nx?x:,,  i pl {p,} :p p,:) 
and 1 I - ( p}/ -= k, by applying the inductive assumption to (** ) we obtain r, = I for 
all i c 1. 5 
Proof. The proof is ;m imnredirtte c‘c~~sequence of Theorem 4.4. 
5. An efficient data structure for range queries 
,- t 1 
._ : 
By uhing the proper data structure for storing the range basis B. we show that 
the <:ompieuity (11‘ checking :I new riinge quer\ can be reduced to O(tl‘, time with 
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O(n) storage or 0( t log n) time with O(n’) storage for t range queries. Before we 
proceed, let us define a symmetric relation ‘X9 on (1, . . . , n + l} as follows: 
Letp,qE(I,..., n + I}, p s%Y’q iff (pq)E KS or (qp)~ KS. 
It can be shown that -X9 is an equivalence relation: 
(I) ‘X9 is symmetric by the definition. 
(2) Since (pp} is a null vector which is always in KS, --YE7 is reflexive, i.e., 
(P ‘YCW. 
(3) ‘YlZfj is transitive because range vectors have the following properties (linear 
s$pace properties): 
(a) If (& (pr) E KS, then (qf \ or (rq) E KS. 
(b) If (pq), (rq) E KS, then (pr) Dr (rp) E KS. 
(c) If (p$. (qr) E KS, then (pr) E .‘(S. 
1 ,et { I, . . . , II + I} be partitioned into a family of equivalence classes denoted by 
Fk+ The equivalence classes corresponding to an integer p, where I s p s n + I, will 
be clenoted [pIKS_ Thus we have 
L Pks = (4 : pXYqandl~q~n+l}, FKS={[p]KS:l~p~n+l]. 
Example 5.1. AQ and tQe range basis are given as in Example 4.3. Then 3 ‘XY 7 
as (3,7) E KS, similarly 7 -:X9 3, 5 -X9 1, etc. Thus, E’;o = { { 1,3,5,7}, {2,6}, j 4)). 
The fcl!owing theorems show that the equivalence classes which partition 
{l,..., ft t I ) can be used to represent KS effectively. 
Theorem 5.2. (ap) E KS #[(Y]~~ = [$JKs, i.e., CY and p are in the same equivalent class. 
Proof. (cLP)E KS iff LY -‘X9 p iff [c& = [plKs. 0 
Let KS be a knowledge space determined by a partition F of the set { I, . . . , iz + 1} 
in the following way: KS is spanned by the set of range vectors V = {(a/3) : c. p E G 
for some GE F}. We have the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.3. Any partition F of { 1, . . . , n -I- 1) determines vector space KS such that 
F --- F. tis - 
Proof. Part [f+ c_ [(Y Itis. If /3 c [~I,_-, then (a/3> is one of the generators of KS, thus 
(@3)C KS, so p E [C&x. 
Part [(I J/. 3 L&s. Let us notice that set of range vectors, V, has the following 
properties: 
(1) V is closed unde: Lransformation TR (defined in Theorem 4.2), thus ‘IR( V) c_ V 
and therefore BE V, where B = TR( . . . TR( V) . . . ) is the range basis for KS. 
(2) If (cup), (@r)~ V, then (ay)~ V. 
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Let P E E~cs; then (a@) E KS and by Theorem 4.4 wz have (cr/3> =C,, , (a&I) where 
{(a,pi) : i E I} c B. With this expression and the above properties (1) and (2) it follows 
that (@)E V and p E [&. 1’1 
Theorem 5.4. The SDB X is secure if there do not exist two consecutive integers in 
any qf the equivalence classes [c&, where ar E { 1, . . . , n + I}. 
Proof. X issecureiff (a(cu+i))EKSforaii <:E(i,...,n}iff a~3Ycu+i doesnot 
holdforall cr~{l,..., n}iff[a]1is#[a+!]KSforall~~{l,...,n}ifftheredonot 
exist two consecutive integers in any of the equivalence classes. cl 
The following theorem shows how F can be updated when new information is 
inserted into KS. , 
Theorem 5.5. G’it:en KS arld a WM* range query (c+), the partitiorl 01’ ( 1, . . . , II + I} 
which corresponds to the new kmwledge space KS’ can be obtained by replacing [cY],~ 
and [p]Ks in FKs with [&+J [,B],,. 
Proof. Let F” denote the new partition of { 1, . . . , n + 1) obtained from FKs by 
replacing [cY]~~ and [/31Ks with [cylKs u [J&. Let KS” be the vector space determined 
(a< in Theorem 5.3) by the new partition F”, then AQ u (( cyp)) c_ KS’% KS’. KS’ is 
the smallest vector space containing AQ and $I@), therefore KS”= KS’. From 
Theorem 5.3 it follows that FKS- = F” thus FKs. = F”. r! 
Example 5.6. Consider AQ, KS, F,, as in Examples 4.3 and 5.1. if the new range 
query (4, 7) were answered, then FhS would become ({ 1, 3,4,-C. 7}, (2,6}} and the 
SD13 X would not be secure because .x2 and _Y~ could be compromised. Thus the 
range query (4,7) should not be answered. However, if (4,6) is the new answered 
range query, FhS would be changed to ({ 1,3,-F, 7) , (2,4,6)} and the SDB X would 
still be secure. 
Theorems 5.2, 5.4 and 5.5 show that the operations being performed on KS can 
be equivalently done on F. They can be formulated by a sequence of three basic 
operations on a set c\f integers { 1,. . . , II + I}: 
FN)(.Y)- find the name of the set in which s is a member, 
L%lo~( G (7’) - replace sets G and G’ by G ~1 G’. 
SI~WKITY( G, G’) - determine whether there exist two consecutive integers in 
C; i-1 <;’ if W, return “no”, otherwise “>~s”. 
With the operations defined as above, we can check whether a new range query 
(np) should be answered or not in the following ways: 
(I) CL .- g whether (cupk KS is equivalent to checking whether FINI)@) = 
FIYI~>(~~) {Theorem 5.2). 
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(2) Updating KS with (a/?) is equivalent to UNION(FINI)((Y), FIND@)). 
(3) Checking security assuming that (@) was answered is equivalent 10 
SECURITY(FIND(LY), FIND(P)). 
As far as the UNION-FIND operations are concerned, we have a very efficient 
data structure which can handle a sequence of t UNION and FIND instructions with 
a worst-case time that is almost linear in t. Precisely, it is 0( nG( n)) where G(n) is 
the number of times the log function must be applied to n to get a result less than 
or equal to 1. 
As shown in [I], UNION and ?IND operations can be done almost in constant 
time for all ‘praciical‘ values of n. k’owever, SEC’IIRITY( G, G’) is comparative!y more 
expensive than the UNION and Flh,> operations. It takes O(n) time by checking 
every element in G u G’. Thus, it takes O(n) time to process a new range S~JM c;uery 
with 0( 11) space for F. 
One way to reduce tfje complexity of the SECLJRITY check is to keep an (n + I ) x 
()I + 1) zero-one matrix C, such that C(i,j) = 1 iff there exist at least two consecutive 
integers in [i],,u [jlKs. Thus, SECURITY([&~, [jlKs) can be checked in constant 
time. However, when [i] Ks and [_jlKs are replaced by [ ilKs u [j],,, matrix C has to 
be updated accordingly. Basically, column i and column j are ‘or’ed together to 
form a new column corresponding to [&+J [jlKs, and rows i and j are ‘or’ed 
together s:milarL.. Thus, the cost of updating C after a UNION operation is still 
O(n 1. One sb’,ay to improve the algorithm is to use a doubly linked list for the non-zero 
elements in each column of C. In this way, when two sets are merged (‘or’ed) 
together, a smaller set is always merged into the larger one. In other words, without 
loss of generality, if column i has more l’s than column j, it wculd be mare eficient 
to ‘or’ column j into column i. We would traverse the l’s in column j and change 
the corresponding entries in column i to I .3 These newly inserted l’s car, be appended 
io the beginning of the list of the I’s in column i. In order to know the number of 
l’s in each column before merging, we can use an array called SIZE, where SIZE(~) 
is the number of l’s in column i. 
In pact, since C is symmetric, we can ‘or’ row j into row i at the same time when 
column j is ‘or’ed into column i. For example, if C&j) = I, C(j, k) must also be 
I and 1 chould be assigned to both C(k, i) and C(i, k). The doubly linked list for 
c-olumn k has to be changed accordingly, i.e., elerr#ent c’(j, k) is deleted from the 
hst while element C( i, k) is inserted to the list. Note that after UNION, column j 
and row j will never be used in the subsequent operations. Moreover, by ‘or’ing 
row j into row i, C can be updated in time proportional to the number of I’s in 
rowj It is obvious that we can execute no more than n - 1 UNION operations, since 
;X 1 in matrix C’ will bc ‘or’ed more than log n time and there are exactly 211 l’s 
in C‘ initially, the total time on updating matrix C i; no more than O(n log n). Th 
we can process t new queries in 0( z log n) time with O( n’) space, where 1-s n. 
’ It‘ that entry in the matrix C‘ is 1 aiginally, nothing nas to be done. 
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6. Conclusion 
It is realistic to assume that statistics are only available for those records which 
have common characteristics. With the restriction on users’ queries, the complexity 
of checking a new range SUM query has reduced from O(n*) time and space to 
either O(n) time and space or O(t log n) time and O(n*) space for t new tange 
queries with t Z= n. It is our belief that this complexity can be further reduced. There 
are still a few problems needed to be solved. One should also be concerned about 
the problem associated with multidimensional range queries. It seems to us, however, 
that there will be no easy solution. Another important aspect is to study range 
queries on other statistical functions. 
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